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Abstract 
The Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the first “global” and largest carbon 
offset instrument, supplementing national or regional cap and trade systems such as the 
European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS).  This paper draws on weekly 
IDEACarbon survey data from 2008 to 2010 to empirically examine how investor’s 
perception of the CDM regulatory and administrative framework affects the price of 
CERs in secondary markets (denoted as sCER) and the price spread with EUAs.  Results 
from cointegration analysis and GARCH modeling indicate that the perception of 
investors about the relative stringency and efficiency of this framework is a significant 
determinant of the sCER price and the EUA-sCER price spread.   An increase in perceived 
stringency causes significant increases in sCER prices and a substantial narrowing of the 
EUA/sCER price spread (and vise versa).  The analysis also shows that the EU ETS market 
was instable over the period examined, with a structural shift occurring at the end of 
2008 likely due to the 2008 financial crisis.   
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1 Introduction  
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) established under the Kyoto Protocol 
has two primary objectives: to promote clean development in non-Annex I countries, 
typically developing countries; and to assist Annex I (developed) countries in achieving 
their Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reduction commitments through cost-effective clean 
production investments in non-Annex I countries (IPCC, 2007).   Certified Emission 
Reduction units (CERs) generated from CDM projects can be used by Annex I countries 
to help comply with their emission reduction targets, supplementing thereby their 
Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) certified by a Joint Implementation Supervisory 
Committee.  By 2012, the end of the Kyoto commitment period, the CDM is expected to 
account for about 1.2 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) in emission 
reductions in non-Annex I countries (World Bank, 2010). 
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest source of 
demand for CERs; other sources of demand include Japan, Canada and private entities 
under regional cap and trade regimes in the United States.   While there is a linking 
mechanism between the EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol, European Union Allowance 
(EUA) units under the EU ETS are only partially substitutable by CERs due to caps limiting 
the degree of substitutability (Flam, 2009).1  Although both Certified Emission Reduction 
(CER) units issued under the CDM and European Union Allowance (EUA) units issued 
under the EU ETS represent the right to emit one ton of CO2 in the atmosphere, CERs 
                                                 
1
 On average, during 2008 to 2010 the limit on CERs as a substitute for EUAs was 13 %.  At the firm level, 
the fungibility between the EUA and the CER will depend on the regulated installation’s location and 
industry, as the CER import cap varies across countries.   
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trade at a discount to EUAs in secondary markets (denoted as sCERs).  The partial 
fungibility between CERs and EUAs and other regulatory uncertainties, including the 
future role of CERs in the EU ETS and delays related to transferring CERs into national 
climate registries, are contributing factors for the discount.   
More recently, the recession and the Eurozone crisis, combined with lack of 
consensus of the worlds’ major economies to continue the Kyoto protocol, have been 
driving down the demand for EURs and sCERs.  This has led to the decline of the trading 
price of sCERs from highs around $20 before the financial crisis to less than $1 in 
October 2012. In response, the European Commission presented proposals to regulate 
the phase III supply of EUAs to be auctioned, in order to support the carbon price and 
restore operators’ confidence.  In the case of sCERs, the situation is further complicated 
by use restrictions on credits from HFC-23 and N2O projects2.  The future role of the 
CDM in carbon trading is uncertain in light of the virtual collapse of CER market prices.   
Yet, there is much to be learned from the 10-year history of the CDM, which 
attracted billons of euros of private capital on an annual basis. Apart from channeling 
funds to developing world for clean development, the CDM is the largest offset 
instrument, complete with functioning frameworks and standards for the issuance and 
trading of credits for GHG reduction.  In the event that governments decide to 
strengthen their collection action to reduce GHG emissions, lessons learned from the 
                                                 
2
 On 25 November 2010, the European Commissioner for Climate Action announced a proposal to prohibit 
use of EURs and CERs from projects involving the destruction of hydrofluorocarbon 23 (HFC-23) and 
nitrous oxid (NxO) in the EU ETS from 1 January 2013.    
 4
CDM experience will be useful in reforming the CDM and developing other market 
instruments.   
Emissions trading schemes (ETS) appear to be a preferred market-based 
instrument for mitigating global climate change, with many countries or jurisdictions 
implementing or planning to implement ETSs3.  Within the ETSs, offsets will likely 
continue to play an important role in reducing mitigation costs and promoting low-
carbon technologies in the developing world.  The Australian Emission Trading Scheme 
will be introduced in July 2015, which allows the use of CERs and will be linked to the EU 
ETS.  China, the world’s largest emitter of GHG, has committed to reduce carbon 
intensity4 by 40-45% in 2020 compared with 2005.  Part of the reduction will likely be 
achieved through a market-based system, such as cap-and-trade.  The Chinese 
government has proposed piloting cap-and-trade systems in selected economic sectors 
and regions before introducing a nationwide ETS.  The pilot ETS in Guangdong province 
now includes carbon credits through carbon sink afforestation projects, indicating the 
potential role for offsets. 
This paper examines how investors’ perceptions about the regulatory and 
administrative framework governing the supply of CERs affects the price of sCERs and 
the EUA-sCERs price spread.  We draw upon IDEACarbon weekly survey data (2008-
2010) concerning premiums that investors placed on assuming various levels of project 
                                                 
3
 Jurisdictions that have ETS implementation in place include the European Union; New South Wales, 
Australia; Alberta, Canada; Tokyo, Japan: New Zealand; Norway; Switzerland; California, the United 
States; Regional Greenhouse Gas initiative in several eastern states of the United States: United Kingdom 
Carbon Reduction Commitment Scheme; and Western Climate Initiative in the western states of the United 
States and some provinces of western Canada.  Countries with plans to introduce a national ETS include 
Brazil, China and the Republic of Korea. 
4
 Carbon intensity is the amount of GHG emitted per unit of GDP.  
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delivery risks in the primary CER market, where project developers negotiate over-the-
counter forward agreements to sell CERs before they are issued.    
Many factors influence the success of a CDM project and the CER price in the 
primary market; some are macro-level risks common to all CDM projects, others are 
project and country specific.  Factors related to the political and administrative 
processes that govern the issuance of CERs are common to all CDM projects, such as 
registration and verification risks.   The premiums that investors put on these risks can 
be used as proxies for their perception about the stringency of the regulatory and 
administrative processes leading up to the issuance of CERs.   The higher the risk 
premium the higher the perceived stringency of the regulatory and administrative 
processes - resulting in longer wait times and/or higher rates of rejection.  Regression 
analysis of the survey and price data shows that premiums placed on registration, 
verification, and issuance risks are positively correlated with the price levels of sCER, 
and negatively correlated with the EUA-CER price spread.   
To our knowledge, this paper provides the first empirical analysis of the supply 
factors of CERs as determinants of the sCER price and the EUA-sCER spread.  It is also 
the first study pointing to a connection between the EUA-sCER price spread and 
investors’ perceived project delivery risks in the primary CER market. Building on the 
analysis by Mansanet-Bataller et al (2010) in examining the price determinants of EUAs 
and CERs, our paper contributes to the emerging literature on the analysis of the sCER 
price dynamics and the EUA/CER price spread.  The next section of the paper, Section 2, 
provides a broad overview of international carbon trading, while the following sub-
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sections outline the particulars of price formation in the primary and secondary markets 
for CDM project-based credits. Section 3 outlines the data and econometric 
specifications for the paper while Sections 4 and 5 present the detailed results of our 
empirical study. The paper concludes with policy implications and recommendations.   
2  An Overview of International Carbon Markets 
2.1 EUA and sCER Spot Price Dynamics 
CDM projects generate CER credits through a variety of emissions reduction 
methodologies. Each unit of CERs represents 1 ton of CO2 emissions (or GHG 
equivalent) and are traded in EU ETS together with EUAs. At present, the national CER 
import quotas are fixed at rates varying from 3% to 50% of total emissions, while the 
aggregate limit or overall “import cap” on the use of project credits in the EU ETS stands 
at roughly 13.5% of total compliance requirements (Gregoriou and Healy, 2009). The EU 
ETS is divided into three phases including 2005-2007, 2008-2012 and 2013-2020. Intra-
phase borrowing and banking of allowances is permitted under the European 
framework, while inter-phase borrowing and banking is forbidden between Phases I and 
II, to contain the fallout from poor policymaking during Phase I.  Inter-phase borrowing 
and banking is allowed between Phases II and III with some restrictions for CERs5.   
Carbon permits are commonly treated in the literature as a pseudo-commodity 
and their prices as a function of demand and supply (Chesney and Taschini 2009).  
Taking the EU ETS as an example, supply side factors include allocation of EUAs under 
                                                 
5
 Use of CERs in EU ETS is restricted to the least advanced countries for projects registered after 2012. In 
addition, credits generated through HFC-23 and N2O projects are prohibited from 1 January 2013.  
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the national allocation plans, rules on banking and borrowing, the number of CERs 
issued by the CDM executive board and the import cap imposed by the EU.  Demand 
side factors are determined directly by projected and actual pollution emissions, which 
are driven by macroeconomic factors such as pollution abatement technologies, 
weather conditions, economic growth and energy-commodities prices (Alberola, et al 
2008).  Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2006) conducted a survey of carbon market 
participants that assessed their beliefs surrounding the factors influencing EUA prices. 
The results indicate that respondents believe regulatory uncertainties and fuel prices 
have the most significant influence on EUA price formation, followed by political risks, 
weather variables, technological development, and technical risks.  In their 2008 paper, 
Alberola et al. found that EUA spot prices react to production levels in regulated sectors, 
natural gas and coal prices, electricity prices, the clean-spark spread, the clean-dark 
spread, and unexpected temperature changes during cold events.6 In addition, 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009) adapted an event studies methodology to show 
that carbon market news significantly influences EUA prices. 
The literature is still emerging on factors influencing the price of CERs and the 
price spread between EUAs and CERs. In their 2010 study, Mansanet-Bataller et al. 
provide the first empirical analysis of sCER price levels and EUA/sCER price spread 
dynamics.  Specifically, they find that EUA and sCER movements share many of the same 
determinants, including oil, coal, and gas prices, news events surrounding the linking 
                                                 
 
6
 The clean-spark spread is the net revenue a natural gas plant makes from selling power after securing 
the required emissions allowances. The clean-dark spread is a corresponding measure for coal-fired power 
plants.  
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mechanism, as well as a momentum indicator that tracks sCER prices lagged five days. 
For the dynamics of the EUA-sCER spread, they identify as significant determinants a 
number of market microstructure variables, including proxies of EUA and CER trading 
activity.  
2.2 CDM Projects and the Primary CER Market 
Unlike the EUAs allocated directly to installations under the National Allocation 
Plans of the EU member countries, behind every sCER there is a unique provenance with 
an implicit background story. CER credits are generated by projects located in non-
Annex 1 developing countries, financed and owned by a wide variety of entities, and 
using alternative methodologies to achieve varying magnitudes and forms of emission 
reductions across different time frames.  All projects undergo a formal review and 
approval process in order to be credited for their emission reductions.  CER purchasing 
agreements are negotiated between buyer and seller at various stages of the project 
review/approval process.  These purchasing agreements are non-standard – each 
associated with an individual set of terms that distribute risk between buyer and seller, 
which are highly relevant to their price.  Though the agreements are generally non- 
standard, it is possible to categorize the most typical deal types (Nordseth, et al 2007).  
Figure 1 presents the main stages of a CDM project activity cycle and the price spreads 
reflecting difference in risk distributions between buy and seller. Of course, all 
differentiation between CER contracts vanishes at the moment they begin trading in the 
secondary market, as they are then free of risk and all equal in credit to one ton of CO2 
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or GHG equivalent. Nonetheless, this section demonstrates how valuable information 
can be extracted from the dynamics of the primary CER market. 
[Figure 1] 
All CDM projects formally enter the activity cycle by submitting a Project Design 
Document (PDD) to a Designated Operational Entity (DOE).7 This document outlines the 
methodology that will be used to reduce emissions in addition to a baseline calculation 
of emissions that would occur in the absence of the project activity. Once the project 
activity is registered and operational, actual emissions are compared to the baseline in 
order to determine the number of CERs that should be credited to the project.  
Following the project design stage is a validation phase where an independent 
DOE evaluates the PDD to ensure that the project meets CDM requirements. If the DOE 
approves the PDD, the project is validated and the DOE submits a request for 
registration to the CDM Executive Board. Within 8 weeks, the Executive Board will either 
request a review of the project activity (at which point the project will be delayed at the 
registration stage), or it will register the project if no issues are found. Registration is the 
formal acceptance by the Executive Board of the validated project as a CDM project 
activity. (UNFCCC, 1997) 
Once the project is registered, an implementation phase begins in which 
emissions reductions are monitored and quantified according to the methodology and 
the baseline set forth in the PDD. Periodically, another DOE (separate from the 
validating DOE) takes steps to verify the monitored emissions reductions. Certification is 
                                                 
 
7
 The DOE is an independent consultant that serves as a mediator between the project developer and 
the CDM Executive Board during several stages of the review process. 
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the DOE’s written assurance to the CDM Executive Board that during a specified time 
period, a project activity actually achieved the emissions reductions as verified. Issuance 
of sCERs takes place pending the results of a final completeness check following the 
submission of a certification request to the CDM Executive Board. (UNFCCC, 1997) 
Up to the point of credit issuance, project developers form expectations about 
the anticipated generation of CERs and their associated revenue streams. Thus, they can 
(and do) enter into over-the-counter forward agreements that transfer the rights to 
ownership of future CER streams from project developers (the short parties in the 
contract) to other carbon market participants (the long parties in the contract). These 
forward contracts are referred to as primary CERs, while the opaque market in which 
they trade is aptly termed the primary CER market. According to Cooper and Ambrosi in 
the World Bank’s State and Trends of the Carbon Market in 2009, project activities in 
China accounted for 62% of the total primary CER market as of 2007.  
Contrary to sCERs, primary CER forward contracts often embed a degree of 
uncertainty and default risk, which varies at different stages of the project activity cycle. 
Settlement of contracts is not guaranteed, and projects can fail any number of review 
criteria set forth by the CDM Executive Board. This makes forward agreements useful 
tools for project developers looking to hedge future credit generation and secondary 
price risks by trading an uncertain and risky stream of future payments for certain (but 
heavily discounted) compensation in advance of CER issuance. 
It is likely that an examination of primary CER prices will reveal key insights 
about the formation of carbon market expectations and risks. In a 2010 analysis of risk 
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premia in CO2 allowance markets, Chevallier (2010) notes how expectations and risk 
preferences of carbon market participants determine futures prices on CO2 allowances. 
In particular, he describes how a market participant looking to buy a futures contract 
will form an expectation about the future spot price of the underlying contract and add 
a risk premium that compensates him for bearing the risk of unfavorable movements in 
the spot price. This “expectations approach” is preferable in the carbon markets in the 
absence of statistical evidence for a cost-of-carry relationship that would justify a theory 
of storage approach to futures pricing (Chevallier, 2010). In the context of this 
theoretical framework, we propose a stylized model for pricing a primary CER forward 
agreement: 
 
Here, CERt denotes the primary CER price at time t, T-t is the wait-time-to-
issuance, r is the discount rate, and πt is the risk premium at time t. Both the 
expectation of the time-T sCER price and the probability of project success are 
conditional upon the information available to the buyer at time t. In particular, this 
time-t conditioning information set Ωt encodes data about the project’s current stage of 
development. As a project moves further along the project activity cycle, the wait-time-
to-issuance should decline while the probability of project success should increase, 
ceteris paribus. This is because, as a project nears the issuance stage, it must pass fewer 
review hurdles (where the CDM Executive Board can potentially delay a project, or even 
reject it).   
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While sCERs are free of the kind of risks that are typically associated with 
primary market CERs, prices of sCERS are affected by the same factors that influence 
project success and wait-time-to-issuance.  The regulatory framework that causes 
changes in wait-time-to-issuance and project success also changes future supply of 
sCERs, causing the prices of EUAs and sCERs to change as well.  As a result, movements 
in primary CER price spreads elucidate vital information about expected sCERs supply in 
the future and should have an impact on sCER prices.   As Figures 2 and 3 illustrate, the 
wait-time-to-issuance is a dynamic feature of the primary CER market that has 
fluctuated wildly even before the start of the 2008-2012 Kyoto Protocol implementation 
period. Therefore, it is clear that primary-market spread dynamics belong in a model 
aiming to trace the evolution of the sCER prices and the EUA-sCER spread.   
Figure 2 illustrates the average wait time until registration after a CDM project 
passes validation and submits a request for registration to the CDM Executive Board. 
This figure shows how from the beginning of the 2008 through May 2008, the average 
wait time between validation and registration increased by about 100 days, while the 
period since May 2008 has seen a remarkable decline in the average wait time from 250 
days in May 2008 to 50 days in November 2009. Similarly, Figure 3 captures the average 
wait time until sCER issuance as emissions reductions undergo a completeness check 
after verification and certification. 
[Figure 2] 
[Figure 3] 
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In the context of the broader emissions trading market, Hitzemann and Uhrig-
Homburg (2010) examine the price dynamics of emission permits in a long-term 
equilibrium model under uncertainty.  They take into account consecutive trading 
periods and assume firms under regulation operate for multiple trading periods.  The 
regulator allocates a certain amount of permits to each regulated firm and the permits 
are bankable.  A penalty is imposed on companies that have realized more emissions at 
the end of a specific trading period than they can cover with allowances.  A firm finds an 
optimal way of hedging the risk of paying penalties by choosing an appropriate trading 
strategy.  The equilibrium spot price of a permit includes two value components: firms 
(i) saving a penalty payment which is weighted by the probability that penalties arise, 
and (ii) receiving an additional payment equal to present value of leftover permits at the 
end of the last trading period.   
In the case of sCERs, if a regulatory framework experiences a change that slows 
down the process that CERs are issued, it will cause less sCERs to be issued by the end of 
the trading period.  The effect of tighter future supply of emission credits is equivalent 
to reduction of future permits available to cover emissions.  This leads to higher current 
spot permit prices including both sCERs and EUAs, and vice versa. In addition, the 
change in the regulatory framework also will also affect the price spread between EUAs 
and sCERs, which is in part due to the EU ETS import cap of 13.4%.  Lowering future 
supply of sCERs reduces the probability of sCER supply exceeding the import cap set by 
the EU and improves the fungibility of sCERs.  This will lead to narrowing of the EUA-
sCER price spread, and vice versa. 
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The relationships between a change of the regulatory framework and sCER 
prices and the EUA-sCER spread will be tested in the following section using IDEAcarbon 
survey data and European Climate Exchange trading data. The econometric 
specifications based on the above theoretical arguments are also presented in the next 
section.   
3. Data 
3. 1 CER Primary Market Survey Data 
The variables for primary CER forward price spreads are constructed using the 
results of the weekly IDEACarbon pCER Index™. Altogether, there are a total of 115 
weekly observations spanning two years of the EU ETS Phase II from March 27, 2008 
through August 26, 2010. This survey asks respondents how much they would be willing 
to pay for primary-market CERs bearing: 
 A) Validation, registration, verification,8 and issuance risks (CERAt); 
 B) Registration, verification, and issuance risks only (CERBt);  
 C) Verification and issuance risks only (CERCt); and finally  
 D) Issuance risks only (CERDt).  
According to Point Carbon’s database of actual transactions, there has been a 
clear tendency towards an increased price differentiation between categories, indicating 
an increased understanding of the risk premiums associated with these transaction 
categories (Nordseth, et al, 2007).  This dataset offers a rare glimpse into the opaque 
                                                 
 
8
 The IDEACarbon pCER Index™ asks respondents how much they would be willing to pay for 
validation, registration, volume, and issuance risks in the primary CER market. As the risk of project 
over/underperformance enters into the picture at the verification stage of the CDM project activity cycle, 
this paper chooses to identify the volume risk with verification risk.  
 15
world of primary CER pricing, where contracts are negotiated over-the-counter between 
project developers and other carbon market participants.  Although broad 
categorizations of the most typical deal types can be identified based on the risk 
distribution between buyer and seller, actual contracts in the primary CER market are 
typically non-standardized and prices vary within each category according to a particular 
project’s underlying performance risk and a set of terms and conditions associated with 
the transaction (Nordseth, et al, 2007).    
The IDEACarbon survey abstracts from project-specific or country-specific risk 
factors and can be interpreted as the average price that respondents are willing to pay 
(per CER) for primary CER forward contracts from average projects at different stages of 
the project activity cycle. The survey respondents’ willingness to pay for bearing various 
types of risks are determined by their perceptions about the opportunity cost of capital 
related to probability of project success, wait-time-to-issuance and expected future 
sCER prices.  The stringency of the CDM Executive Board’s review standards and their 
efficiency in processing the applications would have a direct impact on the wait-time-to-
issuance and the probability of project success.  In addition, the CDM Executive Board 
affects future sCER prices through a general equilibrium effect.  Therefore, the survey 
respondents’ willingness to pay acts as a proxy for the stringency and efficiency of the 
regulatory framework with regards to the various stages of the review process.  We 
construct the primary-market CER forward contract price spreads as follows:  
Issuance Spread:    Issuancet = sCERt – CERDt 
Verification Spread:  Verificationt = CERDt – CERCt 
Registration Spread:  Registrationt = CERCt – CERBt 
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 Validation Spread:  Validationt = CERBt – CERAt  
3.2 EUA and sCER Prices and Their Determinants  
The spot sCER price (sCERt) is obtained from the published Reuters sCER Price 
Index.  Since sCER are forward contracts, the EUA prices are the rolled-over nearest-
maturity EUA futures contract (EUAt) listed on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) 
over the same period.  For both sCER and EUA prices, weekly averages are calculated 
based on daily prices for the same period as when Ideacarbon conducted weekly 
surveys of the primary CER market.  The EUA-sCER price spread (hereafter Spreadt) is 
constructed through subtracting the spot sCER price (sCERt) from the rolled-over 
nearest-maturity EUA futures contract over the same period.   
EUA and sCER prices fluctuate widely and are influenced by macro and micro 
level determinants in the short and long-run.  A number of macro drivers affect the 
supply and demand for permits, including overall GHG quota allocation in Kyoto Annex B 
countries, voluntary GHG mitigation, and the supply of CDM and other projects that 
generate carbon credits.  In the short-run, EUA and sCER price drivers include 
institutional events causing supply and demand shocks, fuel prices (notably the coal-gas 
price differential), European weather and factors affecting speculative activities.   
For energy prices, we use average weekly Brent (BRENT) and natural gas futures 
prices (GASPOOL), coal CIF ARA9 (ARA_COAL) and the baseload electricity price in 
Germany (GER_BASELOAD).  Also used are indicators of market trends, including the 
market volatility index (VIX_CLOSE) and the change in the yield spread between short 
                                                 
9
 CIF ARA defines the price of coal inclusive of freight and insurance delivered to the large North West 
European ports.  
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and long bonds (ΔYIELD_SPREAD). To capture arbitrage opportunities to take advantage 
of the EUA-sCER price spread, we also use EUA trading volume and CER trading volume 
as potential liquidity proxies (since different liquidity risk profiles might contribute to 
the price spread between the EUA and the CER). Intuitively, these contracts should be 
more liquid on higher trading days than on lower trading days.   
In terms of EUA allocation issues, intra-phase supply of EUAs is fixed by the 
National Allocation Plans (NAP), although announcements on the relative strictness of 
the NAPs have a strong impact on EUA prices (Alberola et al. 2008, Mansanet-Bataller 
and Pardo 2009).  Furthermore, EUA prices are influenced by the future role of EUAs 
during Phase III (2013-2020).  Therefore major news events releasing new information 
about NAPs and the future role of EUAs are also EUA and sCER price drivers.  
One important news event related to sCERs is the linking of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
International Log (ITL) and the EU ETS’s Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) 
on October 16th, 2008.  Only after the linking of the two logs could CERs purchased by 
private buyers can be included in the buyer’s national registry account under the ITL.   
Therefore, we include ITL in our specification as an indicator variable, separating the 
periods before and after the ITL-CITL link.   
Table 1 summarizes the data on the sCER and EUA prices and their driving factors 
included in the analysis, while Figure 4 illustrates the dynamic evolution of the EUA-sCER 
price spread and the Issuance, Verification, Registration, and Validation primary CER 
price spreads. Following a brief period of widening spreads, May 2008 marked a turning 
point after which primary- and secondary-market prices and spreads declined through 
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the following winter.  These trends match up with observations on timelag dynamics in 
Figures 2 and 3 of Section 2.3. In general, the price spread between the sCER and EUA is 
both larger and more volatile during 2008 than subsequently in 2009 and 2010.  This 
raises questions about the stability of the carbon market and possibility of structural 
breaks in the data, which will be examined in the empirical analysis. 
[Table 1] 
 
[Figure 4] 
 
4.  Cointegration Analysis  
Although EUAs and sCERs are not the same asset, they share many common 
price drivers.  In fact, EUAs are often times used as a bench mark for negotiating prices 
of CERs in the primary market.   Therefore, it is likely that there exist long-term 
equilibrium relationships between the two variables.  When there are deviations from 
the long-term equilibrium relationship, economic forces act quickly to eliminate the 
deviations through arbitrage opportunities.  Following the methodology of Mansanet-
Bataller et al. (2010), we first identify the possible cointegration relationship between 
EUAs and sCERs, and then employ a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to model the 
data-generating process for each variable.  To validate the approach, we conducted a 
Cointegration ADF test (CADF) and the results support using cointegration techniques to 
model the long-run relations (Table 2).  
[Table 2] 
 
 19
Next we fitted a VAR model relating first differences in sCER prices (∆sCERt) and 
that of EUA prices (∆EUAt) in order to model the data-generating process for each 
variable (Table 3).  Within the VAR framework, a likelihood ratio test confirms the 
optimality of a 6-period lag selection.  Based on the above modeling results, we isolate 
the innovations in ∆sCERt not explained by ∆EUAt and its own lagged values.  Hereafter 
dEUAt refers to the residuals of ∆EUAt in the VAR(6) model relating ∆EUAt and ∆sCERt, 
and similarly dCERt refers to the residuals of ∆sCERt in the VAR(6) model.  As expected, 
∆sCERt and ∆EUAt are confirmed to be stationary processes.  
[Table 3] 
 
5. Empirical Model Specification and Estimation Results 
Following Mansanet et al (2010), we employed the GARCH to examine the price 
drivers of sCERs and the EUA-sCER price spread10.  First, we use the residuals of the 
VAR(6) model for sCER (dsCERt) as dependent variables and the residuals for EUA, and 
the first differences of primary CER price spreads of a set of supply and demand factors 
as independent variables to analyze the price drivers of sCERs.  Second, we use the first 
differences of the EUA-sCER price spread as the dependent variable and the same set of 
independent variables as above.  The empirical model specification for the VAR(6) sCER  
residuals is the following:  
                                                 
10
 Mansanet et al (2011) also employs a modified model (TGARCH). In a TGARCH model, the conditional 
standard deviation is a piecewise linear function of past values of the white noise. This specific functional 
form allows the volatility to react differently depending on the sign of the lagged error term. In our 
estimation, the sign of the lagged error did not make a difference.  So we do not follow Mansanet et al 
(2011) in using the TGARCH approach, but limited our estimation to the GARCH.  
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dsCERt = δ0 + δ1 dEUAt + δ2 ΔValidationt +  δ3 ΔRegistrationt + δ4 ΔValidationt +  δ5 
ΔIssuancet + δi Δother supply and demand factors + εt 
ΔSpreadt = γ0 + γ1 dEUAt + γ2 ΔValidationt +  γ3 ΔRegistrationt + γ4 ΔValidationt +  
γ5 Issuancet + γi Δother supply and demand factors + εt 
We include variables relevant to energy prices and financial market trends.  For 
energy prices, we include average weekly Brent (BRENT) and natural gas futures prices 
(GASPOOL), coal CIF ARA11 (ARA_COAL) and the baseload electricity price in Germany 
(GER_BASELOAD).  Also included is the market volatility index (VIX_CLOSE), and 
ΔYIELD_SPREAD the change in the yield spread between short and long bonds.  Dummy 
variables are also included, indicating major events relevant to the supply and demand 
of EUA and CERs.  
The estimation results for the change in the VAR(6) residuals, dsCER, using a 
GARCH are shown in Table 4.  The results reveal a strong relationship between the 
change in the residuals for sCER and EUA. This testifies to the common sources of 
innovation between the two series. They also indicate a strong relationship with the 
change in the registration price spread from the survey and the issuance spread. 
Interestingly, none of the other price and financial market variables capturing supply 
and demand influences are significant.  It is possible that the EUA residual has already 
captured the supply and demand influences. 
[Table 4] 
                                                 
11
 CIF ARA defines the price of coal inclusive of freight and insurance delivered to the large North West 
European ports.  
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A simpler ordinary least squares equation is also estimated for the change in the 
spread, ΔSpread and presented as Table 5. This equation reveals a strong relationship 
with the change in the price of European Union Allocations --   ΔEUA. It also shows a 
strong link with the change in the registration, verification, and issuance price 
premiums.  ΔVIX_CLOSE, the change in the market volatility index, is also significant at 
10% level.  This indicates that the EUA-sCER spread is at least partially affected by 
factors related to arbitrage opportunities.  
[Table 5] 
Figure 4 above raises some troubling questions about the stability of the carbon 
market. The price spread between the sCER and EUA is both larger and more volatile 
during 2008 than subsequently in 2009 and 2010. To examine this apparent structural 
shift, we carried out a Chow test for coefficient stability for the basis specification in 
Table 5. This test shown in Table 6 confirmed our suspicions that the relationship is not 
stable. It indicates that the hypothesis that there is no breakpoint at the end of 2008 can 
be rejected at least at the 5 per cent level of significance using an F test and at a higher 
level of  significance using the log likelihood ratio or the Wald Statistic. 
[Table 6] 
This structural shift is likely caused by the 2008 financial crisis, reflecting the 
rapid deterioration of the economic situation and massive reduction of industry’s 
demand for allowances.  The EUA price experienced dramatic decline from around €30 
in June 2008 to less than €6 in February 2009, with the price of CER closely tracking that 
of EUA.   
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The estimation results for the equation in the two parts of the sample are shown 
in Tables 7 and 8.  Each part passes a Chow test for stability if its sample is again divided 
in two.  These results show a strong relationship between the change in the spread and 
the change in the price of the EUA and for two or three of the four changes in primary 
CER spread variables.  These support  our hypothesis that regulatory stringency in 
issuing CERs has significant price effects in the secondary market and the support is 
particularly strong at the issuance stage.  
[Table 7] 
[Table 8] 
 
6. Conclusions 
  This paper provides the first empirical analysis of how the regulatory stringency 
and efficiency of the CDM framework affect CER prices in the secondary market and the 
price spread between EUAs and CERs.  We used survey data on investors’ demand for 
risk premium at four stages of forward contracting in the primary CER market to proxy 
for the regulatory stringency and efficiency of the CDM framework.  Cointergration 
analysis and GARCH modeling were conducted to analyze the sCER and EUA prices, the 
EUA-sCER spread and their driving factors.   
We show that there is a strong relationship between the change in the residuals 
for sCER and EUA prices, indicating the common sources of innovation between the two 
series.  This confirms that they share many common price drivers.  The proxies for 
regulatory stringency and efficiency have significant and sizable impact on the CER price 
in the secondary market and the EUA-sCER price spread.  In addition, the carbon market 
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was not stable during 2008-2010, with a structural shift at the end of 2008, likely due to 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis.   
  While economic efficiency is an advantage offered by offsets, the regulatory 
framework and processes have an impact on the cost of supplying carbon credits.  
Careful consideration is needed in the design and implementation of the regulatory 
framework and processes to realize the full potential of economic efficiency offered by 
offset mechanisms.   Given that change in economic conditions can cause paradigm 
shifts in the emissions market, timely adjustments of the relevant supply and demand 
factors are important for maintaining market stability. 
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Figure 1: CDM Project Activity Cycle 
 
Note: Adapted from the UNFCCC’s “Guide to do a CDM project activity.” 
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Figure 2: Average Timelag Between Validation and Registration 
 
 
Note: Adapted from the CDM Pipeline Overview published by CD4CDM  
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Figure 3: Average Timelag Between Registration and Issuance 
 
Note: Adapted from the CDM Pipeline Overview published by CD4CDM  
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Figure 4: Carbon Market Price Spreads 
 
 
Note: Primary-market spreads are derived from the results of the weekly IDEACarbon pCER Index. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Price Series 
    EUAt 16.56 4.84 8.20 27.88 
sCERt 13.89 3.18 7.55 22.15 
CERAt 8.10 0.92 5.85 10.64 
CERBt 9.23 1.19 6.55 12.23 
CERCt 10.40 1.64 7.36 14.39 
CERDt 11.88 2.36 8.11 18.00 
Price Spreads 
    Spreadt 2.66 2.06 0.6 8.69 
Validationt 1.12 0.43 0.41 2.33 
Registrationt 1.17 0.53 0.47 3.05 
Verificationt 1.48 0.83 0.57 3.88 
Issuancet 1.94 1.13 -1.24 5.08 
First Differences 
    ΔSpreadt 0.0363 0.48 -1.18 1.73 
ΔValidationt -0.0026 0.18 -0.69 0.62 
ΔRegistrationt -0.0035 0.33 -2.18 1.82 
ΔVerificationt -0.0055 0.41 -1.58 2.51 
ΔIssuancet -0.0190 0.73 -2.25 2.90 
Technical 
Indicators 
    ΔEUA Open 
Interestt 2.636 16.74 -131.00 18.12 
ΔEUA Volumet 0.000032 5.97 -19.74 21.68 
VAR(6) Residuals 
    ΔsCERt 7.40E-18 0.684 -2.267 2.203 
ΔEUAt -6.48E-18 0.792 -2.873 2.368 
Note: There are 127 weekly observations on each variable in this summary (7 of the observations 
were missing and had to be interpolated between neighboring observations), with first differences 
representing week-on-week changes. EUAt is the price of the rolled-over nearest-maturity EUA Futures 
Contract on the ECX, sCERt is the price of the Reuters sCER Price Index, and CERAt through CERDt are the 
survey results from IDEACarbon’s pCER Index™ on the willingness to pay for primary CER forward contracts 
with different risk profiles. Spreadt = sCERt,-EUAt, Validationt = CERBt - CERAt, Registrationt = CERCt - CERBt, 
Verificationt = CERDt - CERCt, Issuancet = sCERt - CERDt. ∆EUA Open Interestt is the first difference of the 
open interest of EUA Futures Contracts (in millions) on the ECX, and ∆EUA Volumet is the first difference of 
total EUA trading volume for EUA Futures Contracts (in millions) on the ECX. ΔCERt  and ∆EUAt are the 
residuals of the first-differenced EUA price series in the VAR(6) Model relating first-differenced EUA and 
CER prices.     
 
  
 29
  
Table 2: Cointegration Analysis for sCER and EUA 
 
Selected (0.05 level*) Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
  No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 1 2 2 1 2 
Max-Eig 1 2 2 1 2 
 
 Information Criteria by Rank and Model 
   Log Likelihood by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 -208.933 -208.933 -207.629 -207.629 -204.341 
1 -197.412 -197.407 -197.084 -196.921 -195.604 
2 -196.584 -192.491 -192.491 -192.267 -192.267 
 
 Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 3.687418 3.687418 3.698839 3.698839 3.677719 
1   3.564128* 3.580436 3.591533 3.605262 3.600067 
2 3.616125 3.581811 3.581811 3.610928 3.610928 
       Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 
0 4.055158 4.055158 4.112547 4.112547 4.137395 
1  4.023803* 4.063095 4.097176 4.133889 4.151677 
2 4.167736 4.179389 4.179389 4.254474 4.254474 
Lags interval: 1 to 4 
     *Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) 
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Table 3: Vector Autoregression Estimates VAR(6) for ΔsCER and ΔEUA 
 
ΔsCER ΔEUA 
ΔsCER(-1) -0.282462 -0.344998 
ΔsCER(-2) -0.070878 0.148117 
ΔsCER(-3) -0.37396** -0.400856** 
ΔsCER(-4) -0.018711 -0.112126 
ΔsCER(-5) 0.341939** 0.082711 
ΔsCER(-6) 0.06657 0.195124 
ΔEUA(-1) 0.351721** 0.358315** 
ΔEUA(-2) 0.160011 -0.022965 
ΔEUA(-3) 0.388944** 0.403456** 
ΔEUA(-4) -0.085105 0.014765 
ΔEUA(-5) -0.414389** -0.208154 
ΔEUA(-6) 0.093257 0.02165 
Constant 0.003887 -0.047132 
R-squared 0.209857 0.13829 
Adj. R-squared 0.121243 0.04165 
Sum sq. resids 55.62892 74.57058 
S.E. equation 0.721038 0.834818 
F-statistic 2.368216 1.430975 
Log likelihood -124.1453 -141.7279 
Akaike AIC 2.285755 2.578798 
Schwarz SC 2.587733 2.880776 
Mean dependent -0.02625 -0.080083 
S.D. dependent 0.769173 0.852766 
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 0.104267 
Determinant resid covariance 0.082899 
Log likelihood 
 
-191.1377 
Akaike information criterion 3.618961 
Schwarz criterion 
 
4.222918 
Sample (adjusted): 5/15/2008 8/26/2010 n= 120 
** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4: Vector Autoregression Estimates VAR(6) for dsCER and ΔEUA 
 
Dependent Variable: dsCER 
   Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
  Sample (adjusted): 5/15/2008 8/26/2010 n= 120 
  Convergence achieved after 33 iterations 
  Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
  GARCH = C(12) + C(13)*GARCH(-1) 
   Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
dEUA 0.48853 0.049622 9.845122 0 
Constant 0.004218 0.026109 0.161564 0.8716 
ΔValidation 0.008131 0.132765 0.061242 0.9512 
ΔRegistration 0.543301 0.131496 4.13168 0 
ΔVerification 0.193861 0.117109 1.655386 0.0978 
ΔIssuance 0.410813 0.055898 7.349322 0 
ΔGER_BASELOAD 0.001787 0.022195 0.080514 0.9358 
ΔGASPOOL 0.040061 0.030135 1.329393 0.1837 
ΔARA_COAL -0.008047 0.007576 -1.062211 0.2881 
ΔVIX_CLOSE 0.003265 0.004804 0.679618 0.4967 
ΔYIELD_SPREAD -0.168476 0.255796 -0.658632 0.5101 
  Variance Equation     
C 0.137834 0.017377 7.931865 0 
GARCH(-1) -0.97223 0.025203 -38.57662 0 
     R-squared 0.836447     Mean dependent var 7.40E-18 
Adjusted R-squared 0.821443     S.D. dependent var 0.683718 
S.E. of regression 0.288912     Akaike info criterion 0.402394 
Sum squared resid 9.098257     Schwarz criterion 0.704372 
Log likelihood -11.14361     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.525028 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.863639       
Note: ΔGER_BASELOAD is the change in the baseload electricity price in Germany, 
ΔGASPOOL is the change in the price of gas, ΔARA_COAL the change in the price of 
coal, ΔVIX_CLOSE the change in the market volatility index, and ΔYIELD_SPREAD 
the change in the yield spread between short and long bonds. 
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Table 5: Regression Results for ΔSpread for 2008 to 2010 
 
Dependent Variable: ΔSpread 
   Method: Least Squares 
   Sample (adjusted): 4/03/2008 8/26/2010 
  Included observations: 126 after adjustments 
  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
ΔEUA -0.624361 0.055697 -11.20989 0 
Constant -0.0226 0.026749 -0.844878 0.3999 
ΔValidation 0.066479 0.180169 0.368983 0.7128 
ΔRegistration -0.520617 0.097527 -5.338191 0 
ΔVerification -0.46524 0.090567 -5.136968 0 
ΔIssuance -0.60653 0.058318 -10.40045 0 
ΔGER_BASELOAD -0.017283 0.028043 -0.616288 0.5389 
ΔGASPOOL -0.024402 0.038898 -0.627338 0.5317 
ΔARA_COAL 0.007953 0.007986 0.995922 0.3214 
ΔVIX_CLOSE -0.01023 0.005638 -1.814371 0.0722 
ΔYIELD_SPREAD 0.404765 0.281899 1.435852 0.1538 
R-squared 0.648622     Mean dependent var -0.03627 
Adjusted R-squared 0.618067     S.D. dependent var 0.482178 
S.E. of regression 0.29799     Akaike info criterion 0.499737 
Sum squared resid 10.21175     Schwarz criterion 0.747349 
Log likelihood -20.48344     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.600334 
F-statistic 21.22826     Durbin-Watson stat 1.971999 
Prob(F-statistic) 0       
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Table 6: Chow Stability Test for ΔSpread Equation during 2008-2010 
    Chow Breakpoint Test: 12/25/2008  
   Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified 
breakpoints 
  Varying regressors: All equation variables 
  Equation Sample: 4/03/2008 8/26/2010 
  
     F-statistic 1.905386   Prob. F(11,104) 0.0467 
Log likelihood ratio 23.13319 
 
Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.0169 
Wald Statistic  20.95925   Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.0338 
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Table 7: Regression Results for ΔSpread for 2008 
 
Dependent Variable: ΔSpread 
   Method: Least Squares 
   Sample (adjusted): 4/03/2008 12/25/2008 
  Included observations: 39 after adjustments 
  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
ΔEUA -0.65366 0.105753 -6.180984 0 
Constant 0.086019 0.068841 1.249527 0.2218 
ΔValidation -0.463001 0.332104 -1.394144 0.1742 
ΔRegistration 0.62459 0.156442 3.992475 0.0004 
ΔVerification 0.59857 0.152162 3.933765 0.0005 
ΔIssuance 0.68848 0.104226 6.605618 0 
ΔGER_BASELOAD 0.0218 0.056556 0.385451 0.7028 
ΔGASPOOL 0.068255 0.081083 0.841791 0.407 
ΔARA_COAL -0.014357 0.014189 -1.011821 0.3203 
ΔVIX_CLOSE 0.021625 0.01231 1.756784 0.0899 
ΔYIELD_SPREAD -1.144511 0.739719 -1.547223 0.133 
     R-squared 0.77395     Mean dependent var 0.102564 
Adjusted R-squared 0.693218     S.D. dependent var 0.743416 
S.E. of regression 0.411763     Akaike info criterion 1.296006 
Sum squared resid 4.747356     Schwarz criterion 1.765215 
Log likelihood -14.27211     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.464354 
F-statistic 9.586634     Durbin-Watson stat 2.104174 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001       
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Table 8: Regression Results for ΔSpread for 2009 to 2010 
 
Dependent Variable: ΔSpread 
   Method: Least Squares 
   Sample: 1/01/2009 8/26/2010 
   Included observations: 87 
   Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
ΔEUA -0.564247 0.071585 -7.882188 0 
Constant 0.003603 0.023764 0.151628 0.8799 
ΔValidation 0.558679 0.236828 2.359009 0.0209 
ΔRegistration 0.305681 0.194347 1.572859 0.1199 
ΔVerification 0.20746 0.193308 1.073206 0.2866 
ΔIssuance 0.466389 0.076014 6.135526 0 
ΔGER_BASELOAD 0.028162 0.032319 0.871378 0.3863 
ΔGASPOOL -0.007446 0.044693 -0.16661 0.8681 
ΔARA_COAL -0.00777 0.013421 -0.578912 0.5644 
ΔVIX_CLOSE 0.001958 0.006279 0.311872 0.756 
ΔYIELD_SPREAD 0.052363 0.261149 0.200511 0.8416 
R-squared 0.77395     Mean dependent var 0.006552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.693218     S.D. dependent var 0.3014 
S.E. of regression 0.411763     Akaike info criterion -0.084067 
Sum squared resid 4.747356     Schwarz criterion 0.227714 
Log likelihood -14.27211     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.041477 
F-statistic 9.586634     Durbin-Watson stat 2.144202 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001       
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